Acta Cogitata
Volume 4

Article 7

Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case for Moral
Feeling and the Human Relationship to Nature
Katie Coulter
Eastern Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.emich.edu/ac
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Coulter, Katie () "Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case for Moral Feeling and the Human Relationship to Nature," Acta Cogitata:
Vol. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: http://commons.emich.edu/ac/vol4/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@EMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Acta Cogitata by an authorized
editor of DigitalCommons@EMU. For more information, please contact lib-ir@emich.edu.

Katie Coulter

Searching for Ethics’ Grounding

Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case
for Moral Feeling and the Human
Relationship to Nature
Katie Coulter, Eastern Michigan University

Abstract
The following essay considers the question of how ethical and moral theories are possible in
conjunction with the “death of God” as conceptualized by Nietzsche and other continental
thinkers. I argue that ethical and moral action become possible through, and require, a deep
affective experience of something as having absolute value, and that this kind of experience of
absolute value can be found in human beings’ relationship with nature. Using the work of
Bernard Williams and John Russon, I argue that the climate crisis facing the planet makes
apparent this relationship, and makes possible a particular kind of affective response to nature
which, in turn, makes ethical action possible.

Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case for Moral Feeling and the
Human Relationship to Nature
As Nietzsche heralded the death of God, he identified a number of consequences of this
intellectual event. First, Nietzsche celebrated the end of the idea that ethics and morality are
determined and handed down by a deity, as well as the sweeping aside of the idea that in order
for one to be good, there must be a moral authority as the source of what is good. With
academic scholarship and scientific investigation dismantling and replacing foundational
aspects of Christianity and religious belief, Nietzsche saw “the collapse of any theistic support
for morality” (Crowell), and that “the belief in the Christian God has become unworthy of
belief” (Nietzsche, 67). For Nietzsche, the end of the notion of a divine source of morality and
absolute value was “a liberating opportunity to take responsibility for meaning, to exercise
creativity” (Crowell). Without belief in a divine power determining morality, people are free and
responsible to formulate their own conception of moral action and their own attribution of
value. Nietzsche describes this freedom thus:
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. . . we philosophers . . . feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead,”
as if a new dawn shone on us . . . At long last the horizon appears free to us
again, even if it should not be as bright; at long last our ships may venture out
again . . . all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our
sea lies open again, perhaps there as never yet been such an “open sea” (68).
With the death of God, ethics is placed firmly where it should be, and its source is
acknowledged to be what it is and always has been according to Nietzsche: within human
beings. For Nietzsche, there is nothing behind value judgments other than one’s own will
(Leiter). While in the end the view is more complex than this, the important take away for this
paper is that the death of God is the death of the idea that there is objective or absolute value.
Nietzsche had his own ideas about what ethics and morality should look like in the face of this,
but for the purpose of my argument the death of God presents both a loss and gain: the loss of
a millennia-old source of absolute value, and the gain of one’s agency (and the recognition of
that agency) to determine for oneself what is good and bad, right and wrong.
With the loss of objective value comes the prospect of nihilism and the pain and
confusion that can result from it. Several decades before Nietzsche, Hegel described this pain:
“The pure concept, however, or infinity, as the abyss into which all being sinks, must
characterize the infinite pain . . . the feeling that God Himself is dead” (Groom, Fritz, 29).
Nietzsche identifies early on in his writing a “shadow”, as though “some sun seems to have set
and some ancient and profound trust has been turned into doubt” (68). Rose Pfeffer provides a
good understand of the predicament facing human beings:
With the loss of a sense of purpose, resulting from the denial of a teleological
universe, the foundation of a moral world order is shattered. Man (sic) no longer
possesses the ideals and absolute goals toward which to strive. He (sic) has lost
all direction and purpose . . . He (sic) is lost, without a God and without the
promise of a better world.
Having lost the most readily available source of absolute value, one falls into an infinity
of possible values with no handhold. The feeling of responsibility that comes with the freedom
to determine value, and thus morality, for oneself, can be paralyzing. Each thing encountered
or considered must be evaluated independently and its value sought by each individual moral
agent for themselves. With no solid prescriptions of value, Hegel’s abyss opens, and the
prospect that nothing has value looms. I contend however, that additionally distressing is the
endless internal search for something on which to base one’s system of value, meaning, and
morality. The turmoil and confusion of this search for moral solidity has no equal, for without
moral solidity, coherence and meaning cannot be built and relief from the search cannot be
found.
At this point in the discussion, I find it necessary to make apparent an important
distinction. I am not arguing that in order to achieve an ultimate grounding for ethics and
morality there must in fact be something of absolute value. I do not mean to suggest that
morality necessarily requires an objective value. On the contrary, I believe, as Nietzsche did,
that behind morality there is nothing but our own human formulations of value, and behind
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these formulations of value is moral feeling. I am arguing that the experience of something as
having an absolute value, whether positive or negative value, is essential to constructing a
meaningful understanding of the world, and therefore for constructing an ethical theory for
moral action. At its foundation, ethics is a way to find the relative importance of various things
under consideration – an ethical dilemma is the struggle to determine what, in a given
situation, is most important.
Back to the problem at hand: with the death of God, we have found ourselves without
our most familiar source of absolute value, and as the above distinction clarifies, what we have
truly lost is the most readily available source of the experience of absolute value. There are
plenty of ethical theories offering their best understanding of what is most important and how
that can be determined. Various deontologies, utility principles and virtue systems offer
accounts of what is the most important good, and yet often the question of how they are
ultimately grounded remains unanswered. To illustrate this, it is worth looking at how the
Euthyphro Dilemma has been extended to any systematic ethics. The Euthyphro Dilemma finds
religion’s account of morality to be without substance because it either 1) determines the good,
in which case it could decree things normatively considered to be immoral, such as murder, to
be moral, or it 2) merely identifies the good, in which case something else more foundational
must function as the grounding for determining what is moral. Mark Taylor summarizes the
point thus:
Systematic ethics, by their nature, identify almost all moral obligations as
contingencies that rely on an ultimate self-sufficient principle. Such a principle is
reputedly good by its nature and serves as the anchor point from which all other
duties originate. In fact, the rest of the system is really just an extended
explication of the foundational principle. If we were to find that the anchor point
is not independent or necessary, then we should reject that whole system (46).
The problem, Taylor contends, is that all systems of ethics fall victim to the Euthryphro
Dilemma – in the case of consequentialism, Taylor concludes (after much argumentation that
will not be covered here) that “(UP)[the utility principle] is the foundation of Utilitarian
morality, and there exist counter-examples showing that (UP) cannot be equivalent to moral
goodness, so (UP) and Utilitarianism are not related ontologically to moral goodness” (50).
All of this is to say that the problem of experiencing Hegel’s abyss or Nietzsche’s nihilism at the
loss of the experience of absolute value is not easily solved by other groundings for ethics, and
that if this phenomenological experience of chaos and an infinity of moral ambiguity cannot be
given some kind of handhold or foundation, then substantive moral action becomes at best
exceedingly difficult and at worst inconceivable. There is a phenomenological element to ethics
that, as with many phenomenological insights, goes overlooked and yet must always already be
the case in order for moral action to occur at an individual level: one must feel that something
is important in order for one to be moved to act. To be intellectually convinced is to respond to
a strong argument, but more basically, to be convinced is a feeling and an experience. One can
think that something is important, but unless one also experiences it as important, then
impetus for action will be extraordinarily difficult to come by. The conclusion is this: without a
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moral feeling to arouse, galvanize, and thus provoke action, the best ethical system (whether
deontology, consequentialism, etc.) is impotent.
This is illustrated by considering a mental illness like depression. A person with severe
enough depression will find motivation for actions of any kind significantly difficult. Although
cognitive capacities can be affected by depression, what is most handicapped is one’s affective
responses. The world is not experienced as significant, important, or meaningful – without the
feeling that things have importance, the depressed person often does not feel any incentive to
carry out a project of any kind. The result can be that the person’s rational capacities are
entirely unaffected, but even the most carefully constructed argument for actions of any kind,
let alone moral ones, are not convincing to the point of catalyzing action. The depressed person
does not feel or experience the importance of a thing, and thus is unable to generate sufficient
motivation. Rational thought and strong argument alone are an insufficient grounding for an
ethical system, because rational arguments do not fulfill the requirement of feeling morally
moved. Good arguments can contribute to or cause one’s affective response – a good argument
can be the thing that makes one experience the value of a thing. But the catalyst for action
remains the experience of value.
I find an interesting source of support in Robert Elliot’s book Faking Nature. Elliot puts
forth a very complex and careful metaethical theory and grounding for value. Elliot is
exceedingly careful to avoid doing exactly what I am proposing – Elliot wants his argument to
be solidly grounded on a principle that is completely self-sufficient, and he seeks to justify in
this manner all his claims of natural value. And yet, his whole account of value essentially rests
on one footnote: “That nature has value is, so to speak, a brute value fact. Although the fact
does not admit of further explanation, it requires emphasis and discussion . . .” (Elliot, 157).
What Elliot is asserting is contrary to his intended project of finding independent and necessary
value that can avoid the pitfalls of the Euthyphro Dilemma. A “brute value fact” is nothing if not
something that “just has” value. The claim that something “just has” value is an affective claim.
It is feeling and experiencing some thing as important and valuable. In short, it is experiencing
absolute value and thus a handhold while falling into Hegel’s abyss.
While the experience of something as having value is dismissed as a foundation for
ethics because it is capricious, lacking rigor, or far too relative, I would like to contend that the
experience of something having value is in fact one of the best possible groundings for ethics,
and as discussed above, possibly a requirement for engaging in moral action. The criticisms of
capriciousness, lack of rigor and relativity are serious and require discussion, however. A further
elucidation of what it means to experience something as having absolute value will help to
dispel these worries.
To experience something as having absolute value, there can be no ambiguity at all in
that particular experience. Absolute value, or in Elliot’s words a “brute value fact”, implies an
all-encompassing certainty about the value relationship between oneself and the thing
experienced. It is not the case that anything we value satisfies this feeling of encompassing
certainty. If deeply and thoroughly considered, nearly anything experienced as having value can
admit of significant ambiguity – even the value of those one loves most can be consumed and
questioned in the yawning jaws of nihilism. This fact is precisely why nihilism is so persistent:
What is left is a world of mere appearance and semblance, possessing no certainty or
permanence, having no goals, no unity, no truth, no being. “A “horror vacui” seizes man (sic) . . .
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those “higher values” which the Platonic-Christian tradition falsely endowed with objective
validity . . . are in fact merely subjective categories” (Pfeffer 76, 77).
If carefully constructed analytical ethical theories are not enough to convince one of
something’s value to the point of inspiring substantive action and a handhold in the abyss, then
what would be enough to do this while also avoiding being “falsely endowed with objective
validity” (Pfeffer)? We can find this very thing in the human relationship with nature. I would
like to propose that our relationship to nature, while superficially ambiguous, in is fact far more
essential than we generally take it to be, and that the climate crisis makes this essential, given
relationship apparent again. Within our complex, technological and domination-based
experience of nature, there is a more fundamental, foundational relationship that, though
obscured, is in fact original. Through discussion of the work of Bernard Williams and John
Russon, I will offer my case for this original giveness as that to which we can turn for the
experience of absolute value and a handhold as the abyss of nihilism opens beneath us and our
human search for some absolute value troubles us ever more.
We are searching for an experience so powerful, complete, and unambiguous that it
serves as a source of the experience of absolute value, and therefore as something solid on
which we can build our understanding of the value and importance of other things in our
experience. Our relationship with nature satisfies this kind of complete, unambiguous
relationship, as John Russon describes:
There is the inexplicable nurturance of the sun . . . and of the earth that is the
foundation of stability and consistency – these are two original senses,
irreducible forms, that appear compellingly and guidingly for us. These are forms
to which we are inexplicably attuned and to which we owe everything [emphasis
added]. This can be said for the world of nature . . . in general. We only ever
occur ourselves within the self-occurring realm of nature . . .The fertile earth, the
sky that supplies nurturing warmth and clarifying light, and the self-sufficing
rhythm of growth, death, and regeneration are not senses we invent or realities
we make. It is only within their context that we occur [emphasis added] (23).
Here Russon highlights our givenness as biological beings on a natural planet. We fit
within the biological processes and natural realities of earth, sky, growth and death in a way
that is simply unavoidable; these processes cannot be circumvented. The necessary conditions
for our very existence are not contingent – life has developed on the planet in a particular way,
and as such it requires and owes everything it is to the given reality of the natural world. We
have certain kinds of bodies – mortal bodies, bodies originating in nature. This givenness is not
ambiguous, it is not partial, it cannot be questioned. It cannot be questioned because it is the
very parameters by which we exist at all, and “It is these realities to which we must answer, and
their very reality entails that we will be ruined if we fail to respect them” (Russon, 23).
Our relationship to nature is originary in the sense that it is on the basis of nature that we even
have the power to question our relationship with nature at all.
Our reality [is] that which exercises its wonderful (. . . both great and terrible)
power always within a context of other given wonders, to which we must bring
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the appropriate level of honor and respect. All of our accomplishments occur
within and in the terms of this given world, through our given powers (especially
our “cunning” power to control nature by turning its powers against itself). That
we are definitively constrained by the givenness is shown by the ineffaceability
of our death. (Russon, 25)
There is a very specific, unambiguous way in which we are related to nature: nature is
that by which there is anything at all, including us. And as Russon indicates, if we do question or
doubt this relationship, we do so at our own peril. We may question our relationship to nature
and act with hubris in ways that flout what can only be described as a holy bond, but doing so
will only bring us more firmly to the absolute value, and to perhaps the only thing that cannot
be circumvented.
Bernard Williams gives hints to this kind of relationship in his essay Must a Concern for
the Environment be Centred on Human Beings? Though Williams’ objective is different than my
own, at the end of his argument he considers the idea that “human beings have two basic kinds
of emotional relations to nature: gratitude and a sense of peace, on the one hand, terror and
stimulation on the other” (238). He goes on to talk about “what might be called Promethean
fear, a fear of taking too lightly or inconsiderately our relations to nature . . . a sense of an
opposition between ourselves and nature, as an old, unbounded and potentially dangerous
enemy, which requires respect” (239). He then identifies what he considers to be important
about this affective response to nature:
We should not think that if the basis of our sentiments is of such a kind, then it is
simply an archaic remnant which we can ignore. For, first, Promethean fear is a
good general warning device, reminding us still appropriately of what we may
properly fear. But apart from that if it is something that many people deeply feel,
then it is something that is likely to be pervasively connected to things that we
value, to what gives life the kinds of significance that it has. (239)
This Promethean fear that Williams describes is just the kind of affective response that
admits of no ambiguity. The deep-seated, pervasive wariness and respect for nature as both
our genesis and the source of our mortality is not the kind of thing that can fall victim to
nihilism. Kant illustrates this power of nature in his consideration of the sublime:
Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into
the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightening and crashes of thunder,
volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation
they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a
mighty river, etc., make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in
comparison with their power. (144)
If one does question or disregard the value of nature, what nature is to us or means to
us, one will quickly and surely feel the bite of that mistake: you cannot disregard your biological
need for water and food or you will not survive, you cannot disregard the power of the oceans
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or you will drown, you cannot disregard the force of the wind or you will be battered, you
cannot find the freezing temperature of winter “mere appearance and semblance” (Pfeffer, 76)
or you will freeze. One cannot be complacent in the face of the absolute givenness of nature –
there will be swift consequences to equivocating about the value relationship between oneself
and nature. The abyss of not knowing what something means to you or for you suddenly has a
hundred handholds in the form of things that have specific and an absolute value, whether
positive or negative, to your survival as a general human being, and also to the survival of the
specific human body that is you.
And yet there remains an important question: is this the experience of nature that
humanity has now? It seems undeniable that our givenness appears more and more as
relativity, contingency. Technology increasingly pervades our life, domination of nature has only
become more prevalent – at the most extreme in the United States, many of us live constantly
in climate controlled dwellings, never experiencing extreme heat or cold for long. We pipe
water into the desert and grow manicured green lawns. We have available all manner of food
at all times of year. Everything can seem to be possibly contingent; anything can be
circumvented if one employs enough cunning. Indeed, even our ties to the planet itself seem to
be arbitrary – there have been human beings continuously living off of the planet on the
International Space Station in the void of space for over fifteen years. If we assert our human
powers enough, it seems as though we are subject to nothing, answerable to nothing, falling
once more in a an abyss of an infinity of possible meanings; once more nothing is absolute.
But these examples betray themselves. There is nowhere where our utterly unconditional need
for oxygen and atmospheric pressure are more urgently palpable than when venturing into
space. And back on earth, though for long we have evaded, questioned, and circumvented what
Russon calls that “power to which we owe whatever we are,” our answerability, our ultimate
givennes is moving back into our awareness in the form of the climate crisis. We cannot control
the rising seas, the migrating climates, the droughts, the increasingly vicious storms, the toxic
air, all of which we have some amount of responsibility for. Nature is reasserting itself in our
experience as Williams’ “old, unbounded and potentially dangerous enemy,” one which
requires our respect, lest we risk our own ruin.
Pushing the limits only brings into sharper focus that to which we are truly subject, that
which is not contingent, not ambiguous, and cannot be circumvented. That which is once again
experienced as absolute – our given relationship to nature as both our origination and our
potential destruction – can be our handhold, it can be a grounding to meaning, the source of
experiences and feelings of significance, and therefore the impetus for moral action that we are
searching for.
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